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During the three decades that Diamond Kimm spent in the United 
States, he confronted the most powerful judicial and legislative authorities in 
the country.  As a leader in the Korean American community in Los Ange-
les, Kimm spoke publicly about his political beliefs and criticized U.S. policies 
overseas and military intervention on the Korean peninsula.  Immigration 
officials sought to deport Kimm on the basis of his suspected communist affil-
iations and Kimm’s subsequent fight to remain in the country illuminates a 
significant chapter in the development of constitutional protections for immi-
grants, as well as the history of Asian Americans in the United States.
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Introduction
Diamond Kimm, a Korean immigrant, appeared in front of the House of 
Representatives in 1955 after three decades of residence in the United States. 
Kimm faced deportation proceedings and a congressional investigation for 
suspected communist affiliations and activities.  Representative Gordon 
Scherer questioned Kimm about his work with the Los Angeles–based news-
paper, Korean Independence, and asked him to confirm the identity of the 
newspaper’s treasurer.  Kimm responded that Scherer’s questions violated 
his First Amendment rights: “Since I live in this country, I want to uphold the 
Constitution and I refuse to answer.”  Scherer responded that it was “strange” 
that “this North Korean,” a “noncitizen,” would charge Congress with violat-
ing the Constitution.  Kimm said that he would have applied for citizenship 
but the U.S. government’s initiation of deportation proceedings prevented 
him from doing so.  To this, Representative Clyde Doyle replied:
I regret hearing you, a noncitizen of my country all these years saying that 
my Government is at fault . . . it is not very pleasant to hear a man that 
hasn’t proved his right to citizenship . . . charge my Government being at 
fault . . . I direct you to answer the question.  If you don’t like our country, 
why don’t you get out.1
Doyle’s remark was met with applause from the audience.  Kimm 
rejected Doyle’s attack on his patriotism and cited his past military service 
as evidence of his dedication to the United States.  Ultimately, the hearing 
ended with several congressmen wishing aloud that Kimm be immediately 
deported by the Department of Justice.  Scherer said, “There is every reason 
why he should have been deported.”2
This bitter exchange characterizes the political environment in which 
Kimm contested his deportation order.  Catalyzed by the fall of Eastern 
European governments to communist forces and the discovery of Soviet 
espionage within the United States, anti-communist fear and stigma grew 
throughout the 1950s.3  Kimm was one of many individuals who were called to 
appear in front of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), 
a congressional body charged with investigating domestic communist “infil-
tration” and eliminating the perceived threat of a rising communist influence 
from abroad.4
While Kimm faced this unique challenge, the perception of Asian Amer-
icans as a group of threatening foreigners predates Kimm’s case.  Since the 
passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Asian immigrants have been 
denied access to naturalization and citizenship.5  While the earliest seminal 
1. Investigation of Communist Activities in the Los Angeles, Calif., Area—Part 1: 
Hearings Before the Comm. on Un-American Activities H.R., 84th Cong. 1550 (1955) [here-
inafter HUAC Hearing Diamond Kimm Testimony] (Testimony of Diamond Kim [sic]).
2. Id. at 1572.
3. See Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of Freedom 
of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 17–18 (1991).
4. See id. at 18.
5. Asian American immigrants litigated unsuccessfully for naturalization and 
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cases with Asian American litigants involved Chinese, Indian, and Japanese 
immigrants, the Korean American immigrant community began to grow in 
the midtwentieth century.6  Kimm arrived at the tail end of the first wave 
of Korean immigration to the United States, making his first home in Los 
Angeles where he studied geology at the University of Southern California 
(USC) and assumed leadership positions within the Korean American Chris-
tian community and the movement for Korean independence from Japanese 
colonial rule.7
I. Kimm’s Beginnings in the United States
After finishing his undergraduate education at USC, Kimm attended 
a postgraduate program at the Colorado School of Mines until his student 
visa expired in 1938.8  In 1941, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) issued a warrant for his arrest for unlawfully remaining in the United 
States.9  Kimm claimed he intended to return to Korea the year before his 
visa expired but could not do so because the Japanese colonial government in 
Korea would have required Kimm to contribute to “Japan’s war machine” by 
working for the colonial government as a technician.10  Eventually, the Board 
of Immigration of Appeals (BIA) found Kimm to be deportable based on his 
failure to maintain his student status.  However, because Kimm was able to 
establish his “good moral character” for the preceding five years, he was given 
citizenship rights throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (finding that residents of Indian descent were 
ineligible for naturalization); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Geary Act, which mandated that Chinese laborers would 
be deported if they failed to obtain a certificate of residence, unless they were excused by 
the testimony of a white witness); In re Ah Yup, 1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104) 
(finding that residents of Asian descent were ineligible for naturalization).  See also Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“There is a race so different 
from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United 
States.  Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our coun-
try.  I allude to the Chinese race.”).
6. There were three large waves of Korean immigration to the United States: 1) 
1903–1924: labor migration to Hawaii; 2) 1950–1964: migration after the Korean War; and 3) 
1965–present: migration after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965.  See Kyeyoung 
Park, Koreans in the United States, in Encyclopedia of Diasporas 993, 994 (Melvin Ember 
et al. eds., 2005).  When the United States went to war in Korea in 1950, Koreans could not 
immigrate to the United States due to racial quotas, and the 3000-odd Koreans that had 
arrived in the United States before 1924, including Kimm, were denied naturalization.  See 
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History 455 (Updated ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter Cumings, Korea’s Place].
7. See David K. Yoo, Contentious Spirits: Religion in Korean American History, 
1903–1945 105 (2010).
8. See Brief for Petitioner at 4, Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1959) (No. 
15763); see also Cindy I-Fen Cheng, Citizens of Asian America: Democracy and Race 
During the Cold War 137 (2013).
9. The arrest warrant was served on Kimm on March 14, 1942.  Kimm v. Rosenberg, 
363 U.S. 405 (1960).  See Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1959), aff’d sub nom.
10. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4; see also Cheng, supra note 8, at 137.
UCLA ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN LAW JOURNAL20 Vol. 24:17
the option of making a voluntary departure within 60 days after the end of 
World War II.11
During World War II, the U.S. Military’s Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) solicited Kimm to carry out a covert mission against the Japanese 
government.  In July 1945, he entered into the OSS’s employ and trained 
for his mission on Catalina Island, located off the coast of Southern Califor-
nia.  During the course of his training, the U.S. government allegedly offered 
Kimm the option of becoming a citizen.  However, Kimm declined, stating 
that his covert mission could be more successful if he maintained Korean cit-
izenship and avoided arousing suspicions.12
The Japanese surrendered before Kimm could carry out his mission, 
and in September 1945, Kimm left the OSS.13  At the end of the war, Kimm 
submitted several applications to the State Department to receive an exit 
permit to return to Korea but never received a reply.14  Kimm’s immigra-
tion case again lapsed into dormancy until April 1949 when the INS ordered 
Kimm’s case to be reopened to allow him to apply for suspension of his 
deportation order—a form of immigration relief established by Congress 
on July 1, 1948 through amendment of the Immigration Act of 1917.  This 
1948 amendment authorized the Attorney General to suspend deportation 
for aliens who (1) demonstrated good moral character for the preceding five 
years, (2) were eligible for naturalization or were ineligible solely because 
of race, (3) resided continuously in the United States for seven years, and 
(4) resided in the United States on July 1, 1948.  This amendment included a 
notable exception for immigrants who could be found deportable based on 
their membership or past affiliations with the Communist Party; this excep-
tion had been implemented by the Internal Security Act of 1950, which was 
then commonly referred to as the “McCarran Act.”15
Nine days before the Korean War began, and shortly before the enact-
ment of the McCarran Act, Kimm appeared at a hearing in front of the INS, 
where he was advised that the hearing’s purpose was to determine his right 
“to be and remain in the United States and to enable [Kimm] to show cause, 
if there be any, why he should not be deported from the United States” under 
the original warrant of arrest issued in 1941.16  The INS argued that, in light 
of the recent Supreme Court decision, Wong Yang Sung v. mcGrath, Kimm 
required a new hearing for full consideration of his case.17  Kimm’s counsel 
11. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4.
12. See HUAC Hearing Diamond Kimm Testimony, supra note 1, at 1547.
13. See id. at 1546.
14. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 5; Brief for the Respondent at 4, Kimm v. 
Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960) (No. 139) (“Apparent attempts by the petitioner to obtain 
an exit permit in 1946 and again in 1957 . . . were unsuccessful.”).
15. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 5 (“This act was amended by section 22 
of the Internal Security Act of 1950 to include aliens who had ever been members of the 
Communist Party.”).
16. Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1959), aff’d sub nom.
17. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).  See Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d at 
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requested a continuance, which was granted, and the hearing resumed several 
months later on October 2, 1950.
At this continued hearing, Kimm’s counsel argued that the scope should 
be limited to Kimm’s application for suspension of deportation.  However, 
the hearing examiner stated that the INS was permitted to inquire into any 
aspect of Kimm’s residence in the United States because Kimm was applying 
for discretionary relief.18  Kimm’s counsel disagreed, but the hearing exam-
iner continued his questioning and asked Kimm if he was a member of the 
Communist Party.  Kimm’s counsel objected, citing various grounds, including 
Kimm’s First and Fifth Amendment rights, and Kimm did not answer.  The 
hearing was continued again to January 8, 1951 when Kimm appeared with 
new counsel, William Samuels from Los Angeles.  The INS inspector stated 
that the hearing was open “for all purposes” and Samuels did not object to the 
scope.19  The inspector again asked Kimm if he would state whether he was a 
member of the Communist Party, and Kimm replied that he refused to answer 
on the ground of self-incrimination, invoking his Fifth Amendment right.
During the course of these hearings, Kimm presented affidavits in sup-
port of his good moral character, including statements from military officials 
regarding his training and service with the OSS.20  The INS introduced evi-
dence regarding Kimm’s employment history, his lack of criminal record, and 
his FBI report, which included documentation detailing how Kimm had been 
cleared by the War and Navy Departments for employment on classified, con-
fidential, and restricted War and Navy Department contracts.21  The INS never 
introduced evidence substantiating any ties between Kimm and the Com-
munist Party.  However, by solely relying on Kimm’s refusal to answer the 
question regarding Communist Party membership, the INS hearing officer 
concluded that Kimm had failed to meet his burden of proving good moral 
character for the preceding five years, and recommended denial of suspen-
sion of deportation and withdrawal of the privilege of voluntary departure. 
This decision was issued on January 15, 1951, one week after the final hear-
ing.22  In March, Kimm was arrested and served with a deportation order that 
overrode the 1943 order of voluntary departure.23
II. Appeals Process
After the BIA affirmed this deportation order, Kimm filed an appeal 
in the District Court for the Southern District of California challenging the 
775 (“In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the (Wong Yang) Sung v. mcGrath 
case, it will be necessary to accord you a new hearing under that warrant.”).
18. Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d at 776.
19. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 14, at 5.
20. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6.
21. Id.; Diamond Kimm’s Federal Bureau of Investigation File, microformed on 
Korean American Digital Archive, File002/Item003 (Univ. S. Cal. Digital Archive), http://
digitallibrary.usc.edu/cdm/ref/collection/p15799coll126/id/879.
22. See Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d at 776.
23. See Cheng, supra note 8, at 137.
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legality of the INS’ denial of suspension of deportation.  Judge William M. 
Byrne reviewed the administrative record and upheld the BIA’s decision, 
holding that Kimm had failed to meet the good moral character requirement 
and that the INS’ finding was “supported by reasonable, substantial and pro-
bative evidence.”24
Kimm then appealed to the Ninth Circuit where he maintained his 
argument and claimed that he was eligible for suspension of deportation 
because the INS had failed to present sufficient evidence to negate his eli-
gibility for relief.  He argued that he had met the requisite burden of proof 
and his refusal to answer questions probing his Communist Party affiliations 
was insufficient to disprove good moral character.  Kimm believed that the 
INS’ decision unjustly shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner since the 
government attorneys should have been required to affirmatively prove the 
petitioner’s Communist Party membership or affiliation, “[o]therwise the 
alien would have the burden of proving a negative.”25  Furthermore, Kimm 
argued, by penalizing Kimm for invoking his Fifth Amendment right, the 
INS officials “prefer[red] the policy of the anarchist deportation act over the 
policy of the Fifth Amendment,” and, in doing so, they had “denigrate[d]” the 
Constitution.26
In turn, the INS attorneys argued that Kimm failed to prove good moral 
character in accordance with the statutory eligibility carve-out based on Com-
munist Party membership or affiliation.  Although Kimm’s Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination may have justified his refusal to answer the 
government’s question, his silence cost him the “privilege” of immigration 
relief in the form of suspension of deportation.27  The INS attorneys relied on 
the BIA’s opinion, which concluded that “[Kimm] is asking a special favor” 
and therefore “must be willing to permit a thorough examination of his eligi-
bility for that favor[.]”28  They also dismissed Kimm’s claim that he was being 
forced to prove a negative: “The petitioner was not asked to ‘prove’ his non-
membership in the Party.  He was merely asked by the government to answer 
a question.”29
III. The Fifth Amendment and Communism
Although the INS attorneys reduced the question regarding Commu-
nist Party membership to a “mere” inquiry, the question carried significant 
weight at the time.  Kimm’s case began as the stigma against the Communist 
Party emerged in the United States.  By the time Kimm appealed his case, 
anti-communist fear and hysteria were in full force.30  The post–World War 
24. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 7.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 14, at 13.
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id. at 19–20.
30. See Rohr, supra note 3, at 15–17 (writing that the 1930s provided a hospitable 
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II concern with Soviet expansionism stirred a fear of the growing influence 
of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) and individuals who 
sought to overthrow the U.S. government.31  In fact, the McCarran Act, was 
the “most comprehensive and detailed piece of federal legislation directed 
against the CPUSA.”32  The McCarran Act explicitly required the deporta-
tion and barred naturalization of any “alien” who had been a member of any 
communist group, as well as advocates of “doctrines of world Communism.”33 
Congress formed the HUAC in order to hold hearings to investigate domes-
tic communist “infiltration” and pass legislation to target Communist Party 
members and affiliates.34
As the number of investigative bodies grew, constitutional protections 
for suspected Communist Party affiliates waned.  The Fifth Amendment came 
to be seen as a tool for communists and communist sympathizers to circum-
vent congressional regulation, “permitting [communist] partisans to conceal 
their active membership and thereby infiltrate into strategic positions.”35  The 
widespread suspicion of communists was reflected in contemporary Supreme 
Court decisions.  In Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court sustained 
the constitutionality of the Smith Act, which was designed to criminalize the 
activities of “subversive” groups like the Communist Party.36  Dissenting in 
Dennis, Justice Black lamented the powerful sway of public scare:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of 
these [c]ommunist petitioners.  There is hope, however, that in calmer 
times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some 
later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high pre-
ferred place where they belong in a free society.37
Despite Justice Black’s cautionary message, the Supreme Court would 
issue a decision against Kimm nine years later.  In a per curiam opinion, 
five justices largely adopted the INS’ argument and found the suspension 
decade for American Communists in terms of constitutional protections, but in the 1940s, 
Congress began to pass measures designed to combat the perceived threat of various sub-
versive groups during the McCarthy era).
31. See id.; see also Jonathan Stewart, Balancing the Scales of Due Process: material 
Support of Terrorism and the Fifth Amendment, 3 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 311, 314 (2005) 
(explaining that the Smith Act, enacted on June 28, 1940, represented renewed con-
gressional efforts to directly regulate political speech by criminalizing the speech and activ-
ities of those who knowingly or willingly advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government).
32. Rohr, supra note 3, at 13.
33. Id. at 14–15.
34. Id. at 18–19.
35. Case Comment, Self-Incrimination and Federal Anti-Communist measures, 51 
Colum. L. Rev. 206, 218 (1951).
36. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).  See Stewart, supra note 31, at 314; 
see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (finding a defendant guilty of complicity 
in the commission of criminal activity due to his membership in the Communist Party in 
the Supreme Court’s first review of a criminal conviction under the Smith Act membership 
clause).
37. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 581 (Black, J., dissenting).
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of deportation was a form of relief based on “discretion and of administra-
tive grace.”38  Therefore, Kimm was required to supply any information that 
would have a direct bearing on his eligibility for relief, including any evi-
dence of membership in the Communist Party.39  The justices did not address 
Kimm’s Fifth Amendment arguments and instead based their decision on 
Kimm’s failure to meet his statutory burden.40
The dissenting justices criticized the per curiam opinion writers for inap-
propriately shifting the burden of proof to Kimm and for failing to address 
Kimm’s constitutional arguments.  Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion 
focused on the majority’s statutory reading.  He maintained that by reading 
the statutory exception to eligibility as an affirmative requirement, the Court 
adopted a reading of the statute that was not only irrational and punitive, but 
also in conflict with the First Amendment.41  By relying on this “anomalous” 
statutory interpretation, Justice Brennan argued, the Court unduly shifted 
the burden to the petitioner to “prove a negative” in order to qualify for sus-
pension of deportation.42
Justice Black also expressed his disagreement, as he did in Dennis, this 
time joining a dissenting opinion written by Justice Douglas who argued 
that the majority erroneously imputed wrongdoing and penalized Kimm for 
invoking his Fifth Amendment right: “What the case comes down to is simply 
this: invocation of the Fifth Amendment creates suspicions and doubts that 
cloud the alien’s claim of good moral character.”43  Justice Douglas argued 
that the invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege should be considered 
“a neutral act, as consistent with innocence as with guilt.”44  He rebuked the 
majority for sharply departing from the Court’s precedent and historic recog-
nition of the Fifth Amendment privilege.45
Justice Douglas also emphasized that no evidence was brought against 
Kimm, and that his character was reputable in every aspect on the record.46 
38. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 408 (1960) (per curiam).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 415 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 414.
43. Id. at 410 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 411.
45. In support of his argument, Justice Douglas cited the following cases: Grunewald 
v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957) (“Recent re-examination of the history and mean-
ing of the Fifth Amendment has emphasized anew that one of the basic functions of the 
privilege is to protect innocent men.”); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 267 
(1957) (finding that past membership in the Communist Party was not by itself evidence 
that the person was of bad moral character); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs. of the State of 
N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246 (1957) (finding that past membership in the Communist Party was 
not by itself evidence that the person was of bad moral character); and Slochower v. Bd. of 
Higher Educ. of City of N.Y., 350 U.S. 551, 557–558 (1956) (“The privilege serves to protect 
the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.”).  See Kimm 
v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 411 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 409 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The import of 
what we do is underlined by the fact that there is not a shred of evidence of bad character 
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Kimm’s only barrier to eligibility for suspension of deportation was his invo-
cation of the Fifth Amendment, which would have been unnecessary had it 
not been for the INS officer’s question about Communist Party member-
ship—a question that was not statutorily mandated.47  Ultimately, Justice 
Douglas concluded that the majority’s decision reflected a troubling judicial 
trend of shirking constitutional protections because of the political climate: 
“It has become much the fashion to impute wrongdoing to or to impose pun-
ishment on a person for invoking his constitutional rights.”48  While the per 
curiam opinion writers justified their decision by focusing on the nature of 
the relief—namely, that it was a discretionary “favor” based on administra-
tive grace—Justice Douglas argued that Fifth Amendment protections should 
be robust, regardless of the relief requested.
IV. Perception of Korean Immigrants
While Justices Brennan and Douglas discussed the political climate, 
they made little reference to the Supreme Court’s traditional deference to 
Congress in matters of immigration and avoided discussing Kimm’s Korean 
background.49  However, Kimm’s identity as a Korean immigrant and, more 
specifically, a North Korean immigrant, bore some influence on others’ per-
ceptions of him throughout his court proceedings and congressional hearing.
By the time Kimm appeared in front of the Supreme Court in 1960, the 
United States had been entangled in Korean affairs for over a decade, but 
Korean history and politics were still opaque to many congressional lead-
ers.  Historian Bruce Cumings argues that many American leaders failed to 
understand that Korean communist interests were tied to Korean nationalism 
in the record against this alien.”).
47. See id. at 410.
48. Id. at 408.  Despite Justice Douglas’s defense of the invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, subsequent judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege have not accorded strong protections to litigants in noncriminal proceedings.  For 
example, Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. Lettow argue that the “silence penalty” can 
pass constitutional muster in noncriminal proceedings.  See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. 
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 
857, 905 (1995).  However, other practitioners maintain that it is constitutionally prohibited 
to penalize an individual solely on the basis of her invocation of the Fifth Amendment.  See 
Richard L. Scheff, Scott A. Coffina & Jill Baisinger, Taking the Fifth in Civil Litigation, 29 
Litig. 34, 36 (2002) (“While the use of the Fifth Amendment in a civil setting is not consti-
tutionally required to be ‘costless,’ a party cannot be found liable solely because of reliance 
on the Fifth Amendment, as this would effectively constitute a penalty tied to the exercise 
of the privilege.”).
49. See Rohr, supra note 3, at 27–28.  Rohr points to Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580 (1952) and Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) as two examples of the Supreme 
Court’s deference to congressional findings of deportability.  In Harisiades and Galvan, 
both immigrant petitioners were past members of the CPUSA but they never shared the 
CPUSA’s motive to overthrow the U.S. government.  Justice Frankfurter wrote that the 
Court’s decision in Galvan “[struck] one with a sense of harsh incongruity,” but the Court 
would nonetheless defer to Congress in matters of entry and exclusion of immigrants. 
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530.
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rather than Soviet communism.50  Similarly, historian Cindy I-Fen Cheng 
argues that, at the time of Kimm’s HUAC hearing in 1955, American officials 
did not yet understand Korean American political affiliations and assumed 
that any individual from the northern half of the Korean peninsula was 
“subversive” and loyal to the Soviet Union.51  This conflation of Korean and 
Soviet interests shaped U.S. officials’ belief that American democracy was 
fundamentally at odds with North Korea due to North Korea’s ties to the 
Soviet Union.52
This misunderstanding also helps explain the HUAC’s fixation on let-
ters written between North Korean nationalists who supported Korean 
independence.  These letters named Kimm and some of his peers as North 
Korean nationalist leaders based in Los Angeles.  The HUAC’s chief counsel, 
Frank Tavenner, questioned Kimm about his activities based on this corre-
spondence, but Kimm refused to answer his questions, pointing out that these 
letters focused solely on efforts for Korean independence and did not discuss 
the expansion of the Soviet empire nor the downfall of the U.S. government.53
However, Kimm was lumped in with the Soviet threat.  Tavenner ques-
tioned Kimm about his work as a “mail drop for the Soviet Union” and later 
corrected himself, explaining that he meant to say “[mail drop] for North 
Korea.”54  When a congressman asked Tavenner what distinction existed 
between Soviet and North Korean mail drops, Tavenner replied, “There 
might be a technical distinction.  Similarity caused me to make the mistake.”55 
Kimm showed disdain for American ignorance of Korean history and cul-
ture.  When Tavenner asked Kimm if he was born in North or South Korea, 
Kimm retorted, “extreme North,” and when Tavenner asked him to spell out 
his hometown, Kimm replied, “You just write it out because it is not Ameri-
can language.” 56
Kimm was a political actor, and his actions were oftentimes controver-
sial.  His newspaper, Korean Independent, was known for its disapproval of 
the South Korean President, Syngman Rhee, due to Rhee’s support of U.S. 
intervention on the Korean peninsula.  The newspaper instead supported 
Ahn Chang-ho, a Korean independence activist who publicly criticized the 
U.S. military occupation.57  The newspaper also supported protests against 
the U.S. military presence in Korea and therefore became the target of FBI 
and local police surveillance.58  Despite the paper’s left-leaning tendencies, 
50. See Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History 49, 89–90 (2010) [hereinafter 
Cumings, The Korean War].
51. Cheng, supra note 8 at 145.
52. See id. at 146.
53. See HUAC Hearing Diamond Kimm Testimony, supra note 1, at 1559; see also 
Cheng, supra note 8, at 142–43.
54. HUAC Hearing Diamond Kimm Testimony, supra note 1, at 1571.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1545.
57. Cumings, Korea’s Place, supra note 6, at 455.
58. See id.
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the paper’s politics were tepid overall.59  However, at that time, even Korean 
Americans with moderate political views came under government scru-
tiny and were often deported.  The FBI regularly investigated and deported 
Korean immigrants who engaged in protest, expressed communist or pro–
North Korean sentiments, or publicly spoke out against U.S. military presence 
in Korea.60  Although there was no evidence to substantiate Kimm’s connec-
tions to the CPUSA, as one of the more notable Korean American leftist 
activists, he stood little chance of avoiding FBI surveillance and deportation.61
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, Kimm requested permission 
from embassies in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union to immigrate to 
their countries.  His original order of voluntary departure was reinstated in 
1962 and at the age of sixty, he left the United States for Czechoslovkia en 
route to North Korea after thirty-four years of continued residence in the 
United States.62
Conclusion
Kimm’s immigration case might have fared differently today as courts 
have refrained from imposing a penalty based solely on a petitioner’s silence 
in certain circumstances.63  However, Justice Douglas’s vision for the Fifth 
Amendment—as one “equally consistent with innocence as with guilt”64—is 
yet unrealized for all immigrants in deportation proceedings.65  While Kimm’s 
deportation proceedings were unique given his identity as a relatively notable 
political organizer whose case was heard before the highest judicial and leg-
islative bodies in the United States, his deportation proceedings demonstrate 
the historic and present-day limitations of Fifth Amendment protections 
for immigrant petitionersespecially during periods of widespread scare and 
racialized misconceptions.
59. See id.
60. See Cumings, The Korean War, supra note 50, at 91 (explaining that the FBI 
records for many Korean deportees are still classified on this, but it is alleged that some 
who were deported were subsequently executed in South Korea and others went to North 
Korea).
61. See Cheng, supra note 8, at 127, 143.
62. See id. at 138.
63. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit held that the government fails to meet its burden 
of proof if its case is based solely on the petitioner’s silence and refusal to answer the 
government’s questions.  See Urooj v. Holder, 734 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[The] 
Government should not be bailed out from the need to present an adequate prima facie 
case. . . .  We should not encourage the cutting of corners by an agency having such signifi-
cant responsibilities.”) (citations omitted).
64. Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. at 411 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
65. See e.g., Guiterrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011) (immigration 
judge permitted to draw an adverse interest when petitioner invoked his Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination).

